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INTRODUCTION 
Vincent Nguyen’s journey through California’s criminal 
justice system highlights the use of adjudications under Cali-
fornia’s Three Strikes law.1  The case law illuminates the con-
tinued transformation of juveniles being treated as adults and 
the modern flawed approach of equating juvenile adjudications 
to criminal adult convictions. California’s Three Strikes law in-
appropriately allows for juvenile adjudications to enhance an 
adult sentence in the same way a serious or violent adult felony 
does, thus eliminating the confidential and rehabilitative na-
ture of the juvenile justice system.2  The lack of constitutional 
safeguards within the juvenile system requires a continued 
separation between the adult and juvenile offender. 
This Comment begins with a brief background of the crea-
tion of the juvenile justice system and the implications Califor-
nia’s Three Strikes law has on a juvenile adjudication. An in-
depth look of Vincent Nguyen’s journey through California’s 
judicial system highlights the use of a juvenile adjudication as 
a strike offense in a subsequent adult proceeding.  This case 
study goes through a comprehensive  analysis of the reasoning 
of the Sixth District Court of Appeal in its decision to bar the 
use of Nguyen’s adjudication under the Three Strikes law and 
 
 1.  See People v. Nguyen, 146 Cal. App. 4th 1332 (2007); People v. Nguyen, 
152 Cal. App. 4th 1205 (2007); People v. Nguyen, 209 P.3d 946 (2009). 
 2.  See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667 (d)(3) (Deering, 2013). 
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ultimately its reversal by the California Supreme Court.3  Spe-
cifically, this section addresses the United States Supreme 
Court decision in Apprendi v. New Jersey4 and how it applies 
to the Three Strikes law.  The case law is followed by a short 
explanation of the flaw within California’s Three Strikes law 
and an analysis of whether the binding California Supreme 
Court decision was the right decision.  Although the Sixth Dis-
trict Court of Appeal decision was reversed, its arguments are 
highly persuasive and warrant a second look by the California 
Supreme Court.  This Comment then concludes with a sug-
gested proposal for change within California’s Three Strikes 
law. 
I. THE JUVENILE JUSTICE SYSTEM 
The law has always drawn a line between the adult and 
juvenile offender.5  Accountability for committing a crime re-
quired two elements: (1) vicious will (intent) and (2) an unlaw-
ful act.6  To have intent, the offender must understand the dif-
ference between right and wrong; this understanding 
separated the juvenile from the adult offender.7 
Traditionally, the law considered juveniles under the age 
of seven, also known as “infants,” incapable of committing 
crimes.8  Juveniles between the age of seven and fourteen were 
presumed incapable of committing crimes unless they demon-
strated intent. If found guilty, juveniles over seven would face 
the full extent of the law and would be punished and confined 
in the same jails as adults.9 
A. The Development of the Juvenile Justice System 
Treatment of juveniles changed in the 1800s in the United 
States when special juvenile facilities in New York City and 
Chicago were created.  These facilities sought to reform  juve-
nile offenders through rehabilitation and separation from the 
 
 3.  See Nguyen, 146 Cal. App. 4th 1332; Nguyen, 152 Cal. App. 4th 1205; 
Nguyen, 209 P.3d 946. 
 4.  Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000).  
 5.  The History of Juvenile Justice, ABA Division for Public Health, availa-
ble at  http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/publiced/features
/DYJpart1.authcheckdam.pdf  
 6.  Id. 
 7.  Id. 
 8.  Id.  
 9.  Id. 
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adult offenders.10  Cook County, Illinois created the first juve-
nile court in 1899, and shared the same values as the juvenile 
facilities in New York City and Chicago.11  The concept re-
volved around parens patriae (“parent of the country”), which 
authorized the state to act as the guardian for juveniles with 
legal disabilities.12  The court had limited procedural rules and 
considered the juvenile cases to be civil (noncriminal) actions 
that could be resolved by guiding the juvenile away from a life 
of crime and towards being a responsible member of society.13 
“Instead of punishment, ‘[t]he primary motive of the juvenile 
court was to provide rehabilitation and protective supervisor 
for youth.’ ” 14 
“In the 1960s, the Supreme Court made a series of deci-
sions that formalized the juvenile courts and introduced more 
due process protections.”15 United States Supreme Court Jus-
tice Fortas, writing for the majority in review of the juvenile 
case  of Kent v. United States,16 speculated that “there may be 
grounds for concern that the child receives the worst of both 
worlds [in juvenile court]: that he gets neither the protections 
accorded to adults nor the solicitous care and regenerative 
treatment postulated for children.”17  A year after Kent, the 
 
 10.  The History of Juvenile Justice, ABA Division for Public Health, availa-
ble at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/publiced/fea-
tures/DYJpart1.authcheckdam.pdf   
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Id. 
 14.   Juvenile Justice History, Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice, 
available at http://www.cjcj.org/education1/juvenile-justice-history.html. 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966) (The juvenile, at the age of 
16, was apprehended for rape and robbery while on probation for another offense. 
Apprehended juveniles were under the jurisdiction of the District of Columbia 
juvenile court unless, after a “full investigation” the court should use its discre-
tion to waive jurisdiction and remit the juvenile to trial in the United States Dis-
trict Court in the District of Columbia. The juvenile court here, without a hearing 
or statement of reasons, entered a waiver order pursuant to D.C. Code Ann. § 11-
1553 (1965). The juvenile was indicted in the district court, and a motion to dis-
miss the indictment due to an invalid waiver was denied. The juvenile was con-
victed in adult court. On appeal the juvenile jurisdiction waiver was found valid 
and affirmed the juvenile’s criminal convictions. SCOTUS concluded that as a 
condition to a valid waiver, a juvenile is entitled to a hearing, including access to 
social records and those presumably considered by the court and to a statement 
of reasons for the juvenile courts decision. SCOTUS reversed the order affirming 
the convictions and remanded the case for the waiver issue.) 
 17.  The History of Juvenile Justice, ABA Division for Public Health, availa-
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United States Supreme Court in In re Gault18—an opinion 
again by Justice Fortas—found that delinquent juveniles 
should be afforded key elements of due process to ensure fair-
ness in court proceedings: notice of the charges, a right to legal 
counsel, a right against self-incrimination, and a right to con-
front and cross-examine witnesses.19  However, Justice Stew-
art in his dissent warned that by guaranteeing juveniles the 
same due process rights as adults, the juvenile court danger-
ously resembled adult proceedings.20 Justice Stewart argued 
that juvenile proceedings corrected a condition and adult pro-
ceedings convicted and punished, thus by guaranteeing both 
offenders the same due process rights the court subjected juve-
niles to the possibility of harsher punishments for their 
crimes.21 
Three years later, the United States Supreme Court in In 
re Winship,22 afforded juveniles another procedural safeguard 
by requiring the prosecution to prove charges brought against 
a juvenile beyond a reasonable doubt.23 Chief Justice Burger 
 
ble at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/publiced/fea-
tures/DYJpart1.authcheckdam.pdf; see Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 556 
(1966).  
 18.  In re Gault, 87 S. Ct. 1428 (1967) (The juvenile, at the age of 15, was 
taken into custody for lewd phone calls while still on probation. The juvenile was 
committed as a juvenile delinquent to the State Industrial School until the age of 
21. The juvenile’s parents challenged the Supreme Court of Arizona’s judgment 
denying the dismissal of their writ of habeas corpus alleging that due process 
rights were denied to juveniles charged as delinquents. The lower court affirmed 
the dismissal. The appellate court reversed finding that the juvenile and his par-
ents did not receive due process. The delinquency petition was not served on the 
juvenile or his parents, they were not notified of their right to counsel, and the 
juvenile was denied his rights of confrontation and cross-examination of his ac-
cuser. The appellate court also found that the juvenile’s right against self-incrim-
ination was denied when his confession was obtained outside the presence of his 
parents, without counsel and without advisement of his right to remain silent. 
SCOTUS affirmed and reversed the lower courts decision). 
 19.  The History of Juvenile Justice, ABA Division for Public Health, availa-
ble at http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/publiced/features
/DYJpart1.authcheckdam.pdf  (citing In re Gault, 87 S. Ct. 1428 (1967)). 
 20.  Id. at 7; see In re Gault, 87 S. Ct. 1428, 1470 (J. Stewart Dissenting)).  
 21.  Id. 
 22.  In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (The juvenile was charged with com-
mitting acts that would have been classified as larceny had he been an adult. The 
juvenile was found delinquent, a determination that was made based on a pre-
ponderance of the evidence. SCOTUS reviewed the case and determined that the 
Constitutional safeguard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt was required in ju-
venile adjudications and that such requirement would not compromise the sub-
sequent benefits of the juvenile process.) 
 23.  The History of Juvenile Justice, ABA for Public Health, available at 
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asserted in his dissent, to which Justice Stewart joined, “to 
transform juvenile courts into criminal courts, which is what 
we are well on the way to accomplishing . . .” abandons the 
original idea of juvenile courts as flexible and less formal insti-
tutions unique to the juvenile’s needs.24  This trend in trans-
forming the juvenile court into a criminal proceeding slowed 
when the United States Supreme Court in McKeiver v. Penn-
sylvania denied a juvenile the right to a jury trial.25  In its de-
cision, the Court refused to fully equate the juvenile court sys-
tem to an adult criminal proceeding.26  Three Justices 
dissented from the majority’s opinion in McKeiver, arguing 
that a juvenile should be afforded every procedural safeguard 
an adult offender receives when said juvenile is tried for of-
fenses and ordered to confinement—including the right to a 
jury trial.27 
Since McKeiver, the procedural safeguards in place for ju-
veniles has remained the same, despite the continuous change 
in the purpose of the system. The current United States juve-
nile justice system is under a potentially crippling siege that 
retracts from the goal of rehabilitation. Harsher sentencing re-
gimes in place for juveniles, such as California’s Three Strikes 
law,28 point to a trend where juveniles are treated punitively 
rather than through rehabilitation.  Analyzing the Three 
Strikes law highlights the manner in which our system 
equates a juvenile adjudication as a punitive adult conviction. 
II. CALIFORNIA’S THREE STRIKES LAW 
California’s Three Strikes law passed in 1994.29  The con-
cept of three strikes “ensure[s] longer prison sentences and 
 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/publiced/fea-
tures/DYJpart1.authcheckdam.pdf (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970)). 
 24.  Id. at 8. 
 25.  McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971) (SCOTUS reviewed sev-
eral cases where juveniles were adjudicated delinquent and their request for a 
jury trial was denied. SCOTUS affirmed the judgments because the right to a 
jury trial is not guaranteed in juvenile adjudication proceedings under the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution).  
 26.  The History of Juvenile Justice, ABA for Public Health, 8, available at  
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/publiced/fea-
tures/DYJpart1.authcheckdam.pdf (citing McKeiver v. Pennsylvania 403 U.S. 
528 (1971)). 
 27.  Id.  
 28.  CAL. PENAL CODE § 667 (Deering, 2013). 
 29.  Amanda K. Packel, Juvenile Justice and the Punishment of Recidivists 
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greater punishment for those who commit a felony and have 
been previously convicted of serious30 and/or violent31 felo-
nies.”32 Under California’s Three Strikes law, qualifying vari-
ous prior convictions result in an automatic sentence increase: 
the existence of one qualifying prior conviction “requires the 
court to double the sentence for the current offense, regardless 
of the existence of mitigating factors.”33 
Before California passed its Three Strikes law, prior juve-
nile adjudications could not be used to increase a sentence.34  
Although Proposition 835 passed before California’s Three 
Strikes law and mandated that any adult or juvenile felony 
conviction be used to enhance future criminal proceedings, the 
California Courts of Appeal excluded juvenile adjudications 
from such use.36  However, passage of California’s Three 
Strikes law by voters and the legislature changed that practice 
significantly. California Penal Code section 667(d)(3) specifi-
cally provides that a prior juvenile adjudication constitutes a 
prior felony conviction:37 
(d) . . . (3) A prior juvenile adjudication shall constitute a 
prior serious and/or violent felony conviction for purposes 
of sentence enhancement if: (A) The juvenile was 16 years 
of age or older at the time he or she committed the prior 
 
under California’s Three Strikes Law, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1157, 1168 (2002). 
 30.  CAL. PENAL CODE § 1192.7(c) (Deering, 2013). 
 31.  Id. at § 667.5(c). 
 32.  Packel, supra note 29, at 1168 (quoting CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(b) (Deer-
ing, 2013)). 
 33.  Lisa Forquer, Comment, California’s Three Strikes Law-Should a Juve-
nile Adjudication be a Ball or a Strike?, 32 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1297, 1326 (1995)   
 34.  Packel, supra note 29, at 1168; See also Forquer, supra note 33, at 1310-
15 (the judge could consider juvenile adjudications as an aggravating factor in 
considering a defendant’s sentence, but the juvenile adjudication could not be 
used to increase the sentence past the statutory maximum). 
 35.  Cal. Const. art. I, 28(f). This clause of the Victims’ Bill of Rights provides: 
“Any prior felony conviction of any person in any criminal proceedings, whether 
adult or juvenile, shall subsequently be used without limitation for purposes of 
impeachment or enhancement of sentence in any criminal proceeding.” 
 36.  Forquer, supra note 33, at 1311 (noting that “[a]lthough courts could not 
use past juvenile adjudications to enhance criminal sentences, they could use past 
criminal convictions of juveniles for sentence enhancements,” i.e. the courts could 
use convictions of a juvenile who was tried in adult criminal proceedings). Adju-
dications are findings in juvenile proceedings, convictions are findings in adult 
proceedings; KURT KUMLI & GARY C. SEISER, CALIFORNIA JUVENILE COURTS 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (2012).  
 37.  CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(d)(3) (Deering, 2013); See Packel, supra note 29, 
at 1168; See also Forquer, supra note 33, at 1310-15. 
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offense. (B) The prior offense is listed in subdivision (b) of 
Section 707 of the Welfare and Institutions Code or de-
scribed in paragraph (1) or (2) as a serious and/or violent 
felony.38 (C) The juvenile was found to be a fit and proper 
subject to be dealt with under the juvenile court law. 
(D) The juvenile was adjudged a ward of the juvenile court 
within the meaning of Section 602 of the Welfare and Insti-
tutions Code because the person committed an offense 
listed in subdivision (b) of Section 707 of the Welfare and 
Institutions Code.39 
If a prior “juvenile adjudication satisfies the requirements un-
der Three Strikes, the court must count the adjudication as a 
prior strike.”40  Thus the use of a prior juvenile adjudication to 
 
 38.   CAL. WELFARE & INSTITUTION CODE § 707(b) (The offenses included in 
Welfare and Institution Code section 707 are: (1) murder, (2) arson as provided 
in California Penal Code section 451(a)(b), (3) robbery, (4) rape with force, vio-
lence, or threat of great bodily harm, (5) sodomy by force, violence, duress, men-
ace, or threat of great bodily harm, (6) a lewd or lascivious act as provided by 
California Penal Code section 288(b), (7) oral copulation by force, violence, duress, 
menace, or threat of great bodily harm, (8) an offense specified in California Penal 
Code section 289(a), (9) kidnapping for ransom, (10) kidnapping for purposes of 
robbery, (11) kidnapping with bodily harm, (12) attempted murder, (13) assault 
with a firearm or destructive device, (14) assault by any means of force likely to 
produce great bodily injury, (15) discharge of a firearm into an inhabited or occu-
pied building, (16) an offense prescribed in California Penal Code section 1203.09, 
(17) an offense prescribed in California Penal Code sections 12022.5 or 12022.53, 
(18) a felony offense in which the minor personally used a weapon listed in Cali-
fornia Penal Code section 16590(a), (19) a felony offense described in California 
Penal Code section 136.1 or 137, (20) manufacturing, compounding or selling one-
half ounce or more of a salt or solution of a controlled substance specified in Cal-
ifornia Health and Safety Code section 1055(e), (21) a violent felony as defined in 
California Penal Code section 667.5(c), which also would constitute a felony vio-
lation of California Penal Code section 186.22(b), relating to a criminal street 
gang sentencing enhancements, (22) escape by the use of force or violence, from 
a county juvenile hall, home, ranch, camp, or forestry camp in violation of Cali-
fornia Penal Code section 871(b) if great bodily injury is intentionally inflicted on 
an employee of the juvenile facility during the commission of the escape, (23) tor-
ture as described in California Penal Code section 206 and 206.1, (24) aggravated 
mayhem as described in California Penal Code section 205, (25) carjacking, as 
described in California Penal Code section 215, while armed with a dangerous or 
deadly weapon, (26) kidnapping for purposes of sexual assault, as punishable un-
der California Penal Code section 209(b), (27) kidnapping as punishable in Cali-
fornia Penal Code section 209.5, (28) the offense described in California Penal 
Code section 26100(c), (29) the offense described in California Penal Code section 
18745, and (30) voluntary manslaughter as described in California Penal Code 
section 192(a)). 
 39.  CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(d)(3) (Deering, 2013). 
 40.  Forquer, supra note 33, at 1322. 
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automatically increase the base sentence for an offender dras-
tically changed California law and practices. 
III. CHANGES TO JUVENILE ADJUDICATIONS UNDER THE 
THREE STRIKES LAW 
The Three Strikes law and Proposition 18441 significantly 
altered the traditional practices of rehabilitation and confiden-
tiality in the juvenile justice system.42  Before the enactment 
of California’s Three Strikes law, a prior juvenile adjudication 
was a sentencing factor.43 Adjudications would only be viewed 
at the discretion of the judge to determine a sentence for the 
defendant within the statutory maximum.44  In contrast, under 
Three Strikes, a prior juvenile adjudication automatically dou-
bles the defendant’s base sentence for the current offense—this 
is because Three Strikes equates certain juvenile adjudications 
to serious or violent felony adult convictions.45  Qualifying ju-
venile adjudications for a felony offense listed in Welfare and 
Institutions Code section 707(b) or any serious or violent felony 
under sections 667.5 and 1192.7(c) of the California Penal 
Code, committed by a minor sixteen years of age or older, are 
now used as convictions for sentencing enhancement pur-
poses.46  There is some overlap between the Penal Code Code’s 
 
 41.  Proposition 184 is the initiative version of the California Three Strikes 
law. This 1994 proposition was nearly identical to California’s Three Strikes law 
and gave voters the opportunity to essentially vote on the Three Strikes law. The 
72% voter approval of the proposition sent a message of strong support for the 
mandatory sentence enhancement structure; see Packel, supra note 29, at 1167. 
 42.  CALIFORNIA JUVENILE COURTS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 
36, at 3-172. See generally CAL. PENAL CODE § 1170.12(b)(3) (Deering, 2013) (“A 
prior juvenile adjudication shall constitute a prior serious and/or violent felony 
conviction for the purposes of sentence enhancement if: (A) The juvenile was six-
teen years or age or older at the time he or she committed the prior offense; and 
(B) the prior offense is: (i) listed in subdivision (b) of section 707 of the Welfare 
and Institutions Code, or (ii) listed in this subdivision as a serious and/or violent 
felony, and (C) The juvenile was found to be a fit and proper subject to be dealt 
with under the juvenile court law and (D) the juvenile was adjudged a ward of 
the court within the meaning of section 602 of the Welfare and Institutions Code 
because the person committed an offense listed in subdivision (b) of section 707 
of the Welfare and Institutions Code.”). 
 43.  Forquer, supra note 33, at 1326–27. 
 44.  See id. 
 45.  Id. at 1321, 1326. 
 46.  CALIFORNIA JUVENILE COURTS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 
36, at 3-172; See CAL. PENAL CODE § 667 (Deering, 2013); See generally CAL. 
WELFARE & INSTITUTION CODE § 707(b) (The offenses included in Welfare and 
Institution Code section 707 are: (1) murder, (2) arson as provided in California 
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treatment of serious or violent adult felonies and the Welfare 
and Institutions Code treatment of juvenile adjudications.47  
However, offenses such as manufacturing a controlled sub-
stance and escape from juvenile hall are not categorized as se-
rious or violent under the Penal Code, but still count as a strike 
offense against a juvenile offender.48 
A. Dispute Between the Circuits 
Juvenile adjudications used as strike offenses create dis-
putes between state and federal courts.49 The California Court 
of Appeal in People v. Fowler50 first rejected the claim that, due 
to a lack of jury trial, juvenile adjudications cannot be used as 
 
Penal Code section 451(a)(b), (3) robbery, (4) rape with force, violence, or threat 
of great bodily harm, (5) sodomy by force, violence, duress, menace, or threat of 
great bodily harm, (6) a lewd or lascivious act as provided by California Penal 
Code section 288(b), (7) oral copulation by force, violence, duress, menace, or 
threat of great bodily harm, (8) an offense specified in California Penal Code sec-
tion 289(a), (9) kidnapping for ransom, (10) kidnapping for purposes of robbery, 
(11) kidnapping with bodily harm, (12) attempted murder, (13) assault with a 
firearm or destructive device, (14) assault by any means of force likely to produce 
great bodily injury, (15) discharge of a firearm into an inhabited or occupied build-
ing, (16) an offense prescribed in California Penal Code section 1203.09, (17) an 
offense prescribed in California Penal Code sections 12022.5 or 12022.53, (18) a 
felony offense in which the minor personally used a weapon listed in California 
Penal Code section 16590(a), (19) a felony offense described in California Penal 
Code section 136.1 or 137, (20) manufacturing, compounding or selling one-half 
ounce or more of a salt or solution of a controlled substance specified in California 
Health and Safety Code section 1055(e), (21) a violent felony as defined in Cali-
fornia Penal Code section 667.5(c), which also would constitute a felony violation 
of California Penal Code section 186.22(b), relating to a criminal street gang sen-
tencing enhancements, (22) escape by the use of force or violence, from a county 
juvenile hall, home, ranch, camp, or forestry camp in violation of California Penal 
Code section 871(b) if great bodily injury is intentionally inflicted on an employee 
of the juvenile facility during the commission of the escape, (23) torture as de-
scribed in California Penal Code section 206 and 206.1, (24) aggravated mayhem 
as described in California Penal Code section 205, (25) carjacking, as described in 
California Penal Code section 215, while armed with a dangerous or deadly 
weapon, (26) kidnapping for purposes of sexual assault, as punishable under Cal-
ifornia Penal Code section 209(b), (27) kidnapping as punishable in California 
Penal Code section 209.5, (28) the offense described in California Penal Code sec-
tion 26100(c), (29) the offense described in California Penal Code section 18745, 
and (30) voluntary manslaughter as described in California Penal Code section 
192(a)). 
 47.  Packel, supra note 29, at 1169. 
 48.  Id. 
 49.  CALIFORNIA JUVENILE COURTS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 
36, at 3-188. 
 50.  People v. Fowler, 72 Cal. App. 4th 581 (1999). 
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strike offenses.51  Two years later the United States Court of 
Appeal for the Ninth Circuit in United States v. Tighe52 held 
contrary to that, finding that use of prior convictions without a 
jury finding beyond a reasonable doubt was unconstitutional.53 
However, within the following two years, two federal 
cases54 subsequently rejected the reasoning in Tighe, finding 
that the procedural safeguards in place for juvenile proceed-
ings were more than sufficient to count the adjudication as a 
prior conviction.55  California has since followed the trend of 
rejecting the reasoning in Tighe and included in its Penal Code 
the requirement that a jury determine only whether the de-
fendant “has suffered” a prior conviction.56 
The juvenile court additionally changed its procedures for 
sealing a juvenile record. Traditionally juveniles could petition 
the court to seal their records.57  However, due to California’s 
Three Strikes law, juvenile adjudication records for offenses 
under Welfare and Institutions Code section 707(b), when com-
mitted at the age of fourteen or older, can no longer be sealed, 
thus the juvenile’s action follows him or her for life.58 
IV. THE MODERN DAY IMPACT THROUGH PEOPLE V. NGUYEN 
The Santa Clara County Superior Court took on the task 
of issuing an enhanced sentence under California’s Three 
Strikes law based on a qualifying juvenile adjudication in Peo-
ple v. Nguyen.59  On appeal, the defense challenged the inclu-
sion of a juvenile adjudication as a conviction under the Three 
 
 51.  CALIFORNIA JUVENILE COURTS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 
36, at 3-188. 
 52.  United States v. Tighe, 266 F.3d 1187 (9th Cir. 2001).  
 53.  CALIFORNIA JUVENILE COURTS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 
36; Tighe, 266 F.3d at 1193-94. 
 54.  United States v. Smalley, 294 F.3d 130 (8th Cir. 2002); United States v. 
Jones, 332 F.3d 688 (3rd Cir. 2003).  
 55.  CALIFORNIA JUVENILE COURTS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 
36, at 3-189; California cases have followed suit in rejecting the reasoning in 
Tighe. See also Smalley at 1030-32; Jones at 696. 
 56.  CALIFORNIA JUVENILE COURTS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 
36, at 3-189; See also People v. Bowden, 102 Cal. App. 4th 387, 392-93 (2002); 
People v. Lee, 111 Cal. App. 4th 1310, 1316 (2003); People v. Buchanan, 143 Cal. 
App. 4th 139, 149 (2006); People v. Superior Court (Andrades), 113 Cal. App. 4th 
817, 833-34 (2003). 
 57.  CALIFORNIA JUVENILE COURTS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, supra note 
36, at 3-182. 
 58.  Id. at 3-183. 
 59.  People v. Nguyen, 146 Cal. App. 4th 1332 (2007). 
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Strikes law.60  The California Court of Appeal for the Sixth Dis-
trict, in an effort to find the correct constitutional application, 
took an in-depth look at the decisions of the United States Su-
preme Court leading up to and surpassing the application of 
the holding in question: New Jersey v. Apprendi.61 Ultimately, 
the California Supreme Court granted review of Nguyen’s sen-
tence enhancement and ruled in favor of a juvenile adjudica-
tion counting as a qualifying “prior conviction” under the Three 
Strikes law.62 
A. Nguyen’s Juvenile Adjudication 
In December 1999, sixteen year-old defendant Vincent 
Vinhtuong Nguyen fell under juvenile court jurisdiction, pur-
suant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 602, when he 
was accused of  “aggravated assault with a knife and a crowbar 
and inflicting great bodily injury on the victim.”63  The State 
additionally alleged Nguyen was not “a fit and proper subject 
to be dealt with under the juvenile court law . . . .”64 Nguyen 
remained in juvenile court and admitted to assault with a 
deadly weapon, a violation of Penal Code section 245, subdivi-
sion (a)(1),65 in January 2000.  He received a disposition of ju-
venile hall detention.66 
 
 
 60.  Id. 
 61.  Id. 
 62.  People v. Nguyen, 46 Cal. 4th 1007, 1028 (2009). 
 63.  People v. Nguyen, 146 Cal. App. 4th 1332, 1337 (2007) (quoting CAL. 
PENAL CODE §§ 245(a)(1) 12022.7 (Deering, 2013). 
 64.  Nguyen, 146 Cal. App. 4th at 1337 (The California Supreme Court in 
1997 took an in-depth look at the state’s Three Strikes law specifically section 
667, subdivision (d)(3)(C) of the California Penal Code relating to juvenile adju-
dications. In People v. Davis, 15 Cal. 4th 1096, 1098-1101 (1997), the defendant 
was charged with two felony counts in addition to the allegation that his two prior 
juvenile adjudications and one adult conviction counted as sentencing enhance-
ments under the Three Strikes Law. The defendant contended that section 667, 
subdivision (d)(3)(C) of the California Penal Code required an express finding of 
fitness by the juvenile court. The court rejected the defendant’s contention, ruling 
“that there does not have to be an express finding of fitness for a juvenile adjudi-
cation to qualify as a strike within the meaning of section 667, subdivision 
(d)(3)(C), it may be implied.”).  
 65.  CAL. PENAL CODE § 245(a)(1) (Deering, 2013) (stating the applicable pun-
ishment for any person who upon another person commits assault with a deadly 
weapon or instrument, excluding a firearm).  
 66.  Nguyen, 146 Cal. App. 4th at 1337 (alternative placements were consid-
ered, however none were ever found). 
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B. Nguyen’s Adult Proceedings: People v. Nguyen, 
Superior Court of Santa Clara County 
In December 2004, when Vincent Nguyen, was twenty-one 
years old, he was charged with four felonies and two misde-
meanors.67  Nguyen received a negotiated disposition in March  
where he pled no contest to one misdemeanor68 and one fel-
ony.69 
Nguyen waived his statutory right, pursuant to California 
Penal Code section 1025(a)-(b), to a jury trial on whether he 
had “suffered” an alleged prior conviction.70 Based on docu-
mented evidence, the court found the prior 1999 juvenile adju-
dication to be true.71  Nguyen objected to the court’s finding, 
arguing that because he had no right to a jury trial as a juve-
nile, use of his adjudication as a strike in the current case vio-
lated his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.72  The court 
rejected the argument and sentenced him to sixteen months for 
the felony conviction, which then doubled to thirty-two months 
due to the prior juvenile adjudication under the Three Strikes 
law.73 
C. Nguyen’s Appeal: People v. Nguyen, The Court of 
Appeal of California, Sixth Appellate District, January 
2007 
The defense appealed the trial court’s use of Nguyen’s ju-
venile adjudication to increase his sentence, arguing that it vi-
olated his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.74 The Califor-
nia Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s finding that 
Nguyen’s adjudication could be used to increase his sentence, 
 
 67.  Id. at 1336 (explaining the felony counts as: “possession of a firearm by 
an ex-felon (§ 12022.1 (a)(1)), possession of ammunition by an ex-felon (§ 12316 
(b)(1)), possession of a billy (§ 12020 (a)(1)), and possession of methamphetamine 
(Health & Safety Code § 11377(a)).”) (Misdemeanor counts included: “being under 
the influence of a controlled substance (Health & Safety Code § 11550 (a)) and 
possession of drug paraphernalia (Health & Safety Code § 11364(a)”).  
 68.  Nguyen, 146 Cal. App. 4th at 1336; CAL. PENAL CODE § 12020(a)(1) (Deer-
ing, 2013).  
 69.  Nguyen, 146 Cal. App. 4th at 1336; CAL. PENAL CODE § 12021(a)(1) (Deer-
ing, 2013).  
 70.  People v. Nguyen, 209 P.3d 946, 950 (2009). 
 71.  Nguyen, 146 Cal. App. 4th at 1336. 
 72.  Id. 
 73.  Nguyen, 209 P.3d at 949; CAL. PENAL CODE § 18 (Deering, 2013) CAL. 
PENAL CODE §§ 667(e)(1), 1170.12(c)(1) (Deering, 2013). 
 74.  Nguyen, 146 Cal. App. 4th at 1336. 
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holding that a contested juvenile adjudication, under the Three 
Strikes law, could be used for the purpose of enhancing an 
adult sentence “in excess of the maximum sentence that could 
have been imposed on the basis of trial or a defendant’s admis-
sion.”75  The court held that the use of Nguyen’s adjudication, 
which resulted from a judicial admission, was valid under the 
Three Strikes law.76 
Before beginning its analysis of the claims, the Sixth Dis-
trict Court of Appeal noted the traditional premise behind the 
creation of the juvenile system77 and the inherent procedural 
rights78 in place for juveniles.  In reviewing the exclusion of the 
right to a jury trial, the court cited McKeiver v. Pennsylvania79 
and referenced three central ideas behind the U.S. Supreme 
Court’s holding against providing a right to a jury trial in ju-
venile proceedings: (1) the inclusion of this right would bring 
with it the delay and formality of the adversary system taking 
away the informal proceedings and destroy the “aspect of fair-
ness, of concern, of sympathy, and of paternal attention that 
the juvenile court system contemplates;”80 (2) the Court did not 
want to tread in waters which had not been addressed by the 
States or commissioned by the President;81 and (3) the lack of 
support from the legislative and executive branch demon-
strated that jury trials were no more “reliable than court trials 
nor ‘a necessary part even of every criminal process that is fair 
and equitable.’ ” 82 
The United State Supreme Court drew a clear line be-
tween the juvenile and adult system;83 that is until the Three 
Strikes law passed,84 which as the Sixth District Court of Ap-
peal stated, “blur[ed] the line between juvenile adjudications 
 
 75.  Id. at 1361. 
 76.  Nguyen, 146 Cal. App. 4th at 1361 
 77.  Id. at 1337-40 (citations omitted) (stating that the idea was that children, 
due to their young age, were less culpable or not culpable at all and that with the 
right guidance these impressionable youth were susceptible to reform).  
 78.  Nguyen, 146 Cal. App. 4th at 1338 (“[N]otice, counsel, the privilege 
against self-incrimination, confrontation, the presumption of innocence and proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt, [and] double jeopardy.”).  
 79.  McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971). 
 80.  Nguyen, 146 Cal. App. 4th at 1338 (citing McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 550). 
 81.  Id. at 1339 (citing McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 548). 
 82.  Id. (quoting McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 547 (citation omitted)). 
 83.  Nguyen, 146 Cal. App. 4th at 1341. 
 84.  Id. 
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and prior criminal convictions.”85 
D. Recent United State Supreme Court Sixth Amendment 
Case Law 
The United States Supreme Court, in an effort to reestab-
lish a clear line, recently interpreted the right to a jury trial 
under the United States Constitution’s Sixth Amendment.86  In 
Apprendi v. New Jersey,87 the Court held that any fact, except 
the fact of a prior conviction, used against a criminal defendant 
to impose a higher punishment than the statutorily set maxi-
mum must be charged in an indictment and proven to a jury 
beyond a reasonable doubt.88  The trial court enhanced Ap-
prendi’s maximum sentence for firearm possession from ten to 
twelve years.89 The enhancement was based on an evidentiary 
finding that Apprendi acted with a “racially biased purpose,” a 
purpose that was not included in the indictment.90  The 
Court—in referencing Jones v. United States91—stated that 
facts exposing a defendant to a sentence greater than the legal 
maximum are by definition elements of a different offense,92 
not “sentencing factor[s].”93 The Sixth District Court of Appeal 
struggled with how best to apply Apprendi.  Here, in an at-
tempt to better understand Apprendi and its application to ju-
venile adjudications, the Sixth District Court of Appeal looked 
to pre- and post-Apprendi cases.94 
 
 85.  Id.  
 86.  U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 87.  Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (SCOTUS reversed the 
judgment of the state supreme court petitioner finding it unconstitutional to re-
move a jury from assessing the facts that would increase the range of punitive 
measures to which the defendant was exposed. At the trial level petitioner pled 
guilty to third degree offense of unlawful possession of an antipersonnel bomb 
and two counts of second degree possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose. 
The trial court enhanced petitioners sentence, finding by a preponderance of the 
evidence that petitioner acted with the intention to intimidate a person or group 
of people due to their race. The appellate court and state supreme court affirmed 
the sentence). 
 88.  Nguyen, 146 Cal. App. 4th at 1341. 
 89.  Id. at 1345; see Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 471. 
 90.  Nguyen, 146 Cal. App. 4th at 1343; see Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 471. 
 91.  Id.; Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999). 
 92.  Nguyen, 146 Cal. App. 4th at 1345 (citing Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 482-83). 
 93.  Id. (citing Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 485) (explaining that the United States 
Supreme Court coined the term “sentencing factor” in McMillan v. Pennsylvania, 
477 U.S. 79 (1986), which referred to a fact that could affect the sentence, was 
not found by a jury, and was instead imposed by a judge). 
 94.  Id. at 1342-48; See generally Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 
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1. United States Supreme Court Decisions pre-Apprendi 
Beginning with Almendarez-Torres95 in 1998 (pre-Ap-
prendi), the United States Supreme Court analyzed a federal 
statute that authorized a two-year maximum sentence for an 
illegal immigration offense with a sentence enhancement of up 
to twenty years if the defendant had suffered certain prior con-
victions.96  At the district court level, after Almendarez-Torres 
admitted to having suffered three prior convictions, he argued 
that his sentence could not be enhanced because his indict-
ment, which must set forth all elements of the crime, did not 
mention his prior convictions.97  The district court disagreed 
with Almendarez-Torres and sentenced him to eighty-five 
months.  The appellate court upheld his sentence and the 
United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.98 The United 
States Supreme Court rejected Almendarez-Torres’s claim 
that, according to the Constitution, Congress is required to 
treat recidivism as an element of the offense.99  As a result of 
the United States Supreme Court’s decision, recidivism contin-
ued to be treated as a sentencing factor and not an element of 
the crime.100 
In the next term, still pre-Apprendi, the United States Su-
preme Court in Jones101 analyzed “the federal carjacking stat-
ute which provides for an enhanced sentence if serious bodily 
injury occurs during the commission of the offense.”102  The jury 
convicted Jones of such offense and he was sentenced to 
twenty-five years—ten more years than the maximum statu-
tory sentence.103 Although the indictment did not allege serious 
 
U.S. 224 (1998); United States v. Jones, 332 F.3d 688 (3rd Cir. 2003); Apprendi, 
530 U.S. 466; Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002); Blakely v. Washington, 542 
U.S. 296 (2004); United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
 95.  Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. 224. 
 96.  Nguyen, 146 Cal. App. 4th at 1342 (citing Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. 
at 229). 
 97.  Id. (citing Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 227). 
 98.  Id. 
 99.  Nguyen, 146 Cal. App. 4th at 1342 (citing Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. 
at 239). 
 100.  Id. at 1342-43 (citing Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 239-46); See also 
McMillian v. Pennsylvania, 477 U.S. 79 (1986) (holding a mandatory minimum 
sentence to be Constitutional). 
 101.  Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999). 
 102.  Nguyen, 146 Cal. App. 4th at 1343; Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 
(1999). 
 103.  Id. 
2015] JUVENILE OFFENSES & THREE STRIKES 933 
bodily injury, the trial court, at an evidentiary hearing outside 
the presence of a jury, made a finding of serious bodily in-
jury.104  The United States Supreme Court granted certio-
rari.105  The Court concluded that the allegation of “great bodily 
injury” was not a “sentencing factor” and thus was subject to a 
finding, by a preponderance of the evidence, by the judicial fact 
finder.106 
Thus, the Court rejected the claim that Almendarez-Torres 
allowed any sentencing enhancement fact, which increased the 
maximum statutory punishment, to be determined outside the 
presence of a jury.107  The Court reasoned that Almendarez-
Torres rested in the tradition of recidivism and that the use of 
recidivism to increase the maximum sentence did not need to 
be charged in the indictment.108  Sentence enhancements based 
on recidivism, as suggested in Almendarez-Torres, may be dis-
tinguished constitutionally from alternative facts that may ex-
tend the range of sentencing.109  Unlike other sentence en-
hancements, a prior conviction must have been established 
through constitutional due process satisfying the guarantees 
of a right to a jury trial, reasonable doubt, and fair notice.110  
Almendarez-Torres thus became the exception and not the 
rule.111 
2. United States Supreme Court Decisions post-Apprendi 
The Sixth District Court of Appeal attempted to clarify the 
United States Supreme Court’s use of sentencing factors by an-
alyzing two post-Apprendi cases: Blakely v. Washington112 and 
United States v. Booker.113  The Court in Blakely found a stat-
utory scheme that allowed judicial discretion in imposing a 
sentence above the statutory legal maximum, if there was a 
 
 104.  Nguyen, 146 Cal. App. 4th at 1343 (citing Jones, 526 U.S. 227). 
 105.  Id. at 1344 (citing Jones, 526 U.S. at 239). 
 106.  Id. at 1343 (citing Jones, 526 U.S. at 239). 
 107.  Id. at 1344 (citing Jones, 526 U.S. at 248-49). 
 108.  Id. (citing Jones, 526 U.S. at 249). 
 109.  Id. (citing Jones,  526 U.S. at 249). 
 110.  Nguyen, 146 Cal. App. 4th at 1344 (citing Jones, 526 U.S. at 249). 
 111.  Id. at 1346 (citing Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 489-90) (stating that if Al-
mendarez-Torres had challenged the accuracy of the “fact” of prior conviction in 
his case then the due process and Sixth Amendment concerns would not have 
been mitigated). 
 112.  Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). 
 113.  United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
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finding of aggravating factors, to be unconstitutional.114  Thus, 
the United States Supreme Court undoubtedly reaffirmed Ap-
prendi,115 explaining that the statutory maximum is the maxi-
mum sentence that a judge can impose without any additional 
findings.116 
In Booker, the trial court, in a post-trial sentencing pro-
ceeding, enhanced the defendant’s sentence after finding—by 
a preponderance of the evidence—that the defendant pos-
sessed a greater quantity of drugs than found by the jury.117 In 
reviewing Booker, the United States Supreme Court, again re-
affirmed Apprendi by holding that “[a]ny fact (other than a 
prior conviction) which is necessary to support a sentence ex-
ceeding the maximum number authorized by the facts estab-
lished by a plea agreement or a jury verdict must be admitted 
by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable 
doubt.”118  As a result, the United States Supreme Court up-
held the distinction between sentencing elements and sentenc-
ing factors.119 
The Sixth District Court of Appeal noted, however, that 
the United States Supreme Court has not given an answer as 
to whether juvenile adjudications count as a prior conviction 
after Apprendi.120  Lower courts remain divided on the issue.121 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,122 in a divided panel, held 
that juvenile adjudications for the purposes of Apprendi did not 
constitute a prior conviction.123  The majority, using the lan-
guage in Jones and Apprendi, viewed this exception narrowly, 
limiting prior convictions to those utilizing procedural safe-
guards, such as a jury trial and a finding beyond a reasonable 
doubt.124  The majority found that juvenile adjudications made 
without a jury trial could not qualify as prior convictions.125 
The dissent viewed the majority’s interpretation of Jones 
 
 114.  Nguyen, 146 Cal. App. 4th at 1346 (citing Blakely, 542 U.S. at 300). 
 115.  Apprendi, 530 U.S. 466.   
 116.  Nguyen, 146 Cal. App. 4th at 1346-47 (citing Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303-
06). 
 117.  Booker, 543 U.S. 220. 
 118.  Nguyen, 146 Cal. App. 4th at 1347 (quoting Booker, 543 U.S. at 244). 
 119.  Nguyen, 146 Cal. App. 4th at 1348. 
 120.  See id. at 1347-48. 
 121.  Id. at 1348. 
 122.  Tighe, 266 F.3d 1187. 
 123.  Nguyen, 146 Cal. App. 4th at 1348 (citing Tighe, 266 F.3d at 1194). 
 124.  Nguyen, 146 Cal. App. 4th at 1348.  
 125.  Nguyen, 146 Cal. App. 4th at 1348 (citing Tighe, 266 F.3d at 1194). 
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as a logical “quantum leap.”126  In Justice Brunetti’s view, 
Jones stood for the proposition that Congress’s constitutional 
power consisted of the power to treat prior convictions as sen-
tencing factors, subject to a lesser burden of proof; for adults 
this includes a jury trial, and for juveniles it does not.127  Thus, 
allowing a juvenile adjudication to count as a prior conviction 
for sentencing purposes remains constitutional since the juve-
nile received every “process constitutionally due at the juvenile 
stage.”128  A number of state court opinions have adopted Jus-
tice Brunetti’s views.129 However, an increasing number of 
state courts have followed the majority’s view that juvenile ad-
judications do not qualify as prior convictions for the purpose 
of Apprendi, barring their use for enhancing adult sentences.130 
E. The Sixth District Court of Appeal’s Decision 
The Sixth District Court of Appeal relied on three consid-
erations in determining why the use of juvenile adjudications, 
for the purpose of Apprendi, are not barred from use as 
“strikes” under the Three Strikes law: “(1) recidivism is differ-
ent; (2) juries add nothing to the reliability of a trial’s fact find-
ing function; and (3) juries are not indispensable to due process 
in the context of sentencing above the statutory maximum.”131  
In Nguyen, the Sixth District Court of Appeal took each one of 
these considerations in turn, focusing particularly on the ra-
tionale from People v. Fowler,132 in which the defendant’s con-
viction was enhanced due to a finding of having suffered two 
prior felonies, one a juvenile adjudication, under California’s 
 
 126.  Id. (citing Tighe, 266 F.3d at 1200 (Brunetti, J. dissenting)). 
 127.  Nguyen, 146 Cal. App. 4th at 1348. 
 128.  Id.; The dissents view was adopted by the Eighth Circuit (United States 
v. Smalley 249 F.3d 1030 (8th Cir. 2002)), Smalley was followed by the Third 
Circuit (United States v. Jones, 332 F.3d 668 (3rd Cir. 2003)), and by the Eleventh 
Circuit (United States v. Burge, 407 F.3d 1183 (11th Cir. 2005)).  
 129.  Nguyen, 146 Cal. App. 4th at 1349; See generally State v. Hitt, 42 P.3d 
732, 739 (2002), vacated, 842 N.E.2d 320; People v. Bowden, 102 Cal. App. 4th 
387 (2002); People v. Smith, 110 Cal. App. 4th 1072 (2003); People v. Lee, 111 
Cal. App. 4th 1310 (2003) (Rushing, P.J., dissenting); People v. Super. Ct. (An-
drades), 113 Cal. App. 4th 817 (2003); See also People v. Fowler, 72 Cal. App. 4th 
581 (1999).  
 130.  Nguyen, 146 Cal. App. 4th at 1349; See generally State v. Brown, 879 So. 
2d 1276, 1290 (La. 2004); Pinkston v. State, 836 N.E.2d 453 (Ind. App. 2005). 
 131.  Nguyen, 146 Cal. App. 4th at 1349. 
 132.  People v. Fowler, 72 Cal. App. 4th 581 (1999). 
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Three Strikes law. 133 
1. Recidivism 
The United States Supreme Court in Apprendi did not 
overrule Almendarez-Torres, but only limited its holding with 
a narrow exception.134  Thus, the lower courts were left to an-
swer the question of how to interpret the term “prior convic-
tions” that reflect recidivism under California’s Three Strikes 
law, such as adjudications, but are not considered convictions 
by definition.135  The Fifth District Court of Appeal in Fowler 
addressed this question by evaluating the purpose of Califor-
nia’s Three Strikes law, i.e., to “provide greater punishment for 
recidivists.”136 There, the court determined that juvenile adju-
dications fell within the tradition of recidivism vested in the 
Three Strikes law.137  The court reasoned that a prior juvenile 
adjudication, although not a conviction, demonstrated that, by 
re-offending, the defendant failed to draw the proper lesson 
from the first violation, and thus his recidivism warranted a 
harsher punishment in an adult proceeding.138 
The Sixth District Court of Appeal, however, found several 
problems with Fowler’s reliance on recidivism.139  First, the 
court in Fowler, although pre-Apprendi, did not appreciate the 
distinction between sentencing elements relating to the offense 
that judges may consider in imposing sentences within the le-
gal statutory limit and sentencing factors that mandate sen-
tences over the legal statutory maximum authorized by a jury 
verdict.140 
 
 133.  Although Fowler, 72 Cal. App. 4th at 581, was decided before Apprendi 
v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), the rationales have been uniformly credited 
as strongly influencing post-Apprendi cases. In Fowler, the defendant’s conviction 
for oral copulation while confined in a detention facility was enhanced under the 
Three Strikes law due to a finding that he had suffered two prior qualifying felo-
nies, one being from a juvenile adjudication. Fowler appealed asserting that the 
use of his juvenile adjudication under the Three Strikes law was unconstitutional, 
the Court of Appeal rejected his assertion.  
 134.  Nguyen, 146 Cal. App. 4th at 1351. 
 135.  Nguyen, 146 Cal. App. 4th at 1351. 
 136.  Id. (quoting Fowler, 72 Cal. App. 4th at 584). 
 137.  Id. (quoting Fowler, 72 Cal. App. 4th at 585). 
 138.  Id. (citing Fowler, 72 Cal. App. 4th at 587). 
 139.  Id. 
 140.  Id. at 1352; see Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 481 (2000). 
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Second, the reasoning in Fowler that approved the incor-
rect use of juvenile adjudications focused on People v. Lucky,141 
a case where the facts of the juvenile’s conduct were tried to a 
jury.142  Third, the court relied on language offered in Al-
mendarez-Torres that referenced recidivism as only applicable 
to the question of punishment.143  Although possibly true, the 
court stated that it did not mean that recidivism was immune 
from the scrutiny of the Constitution’s Sixth Amendment.144 
Lastly, this court objected to the Fowler court’s assump-
tion that a juvenile adjudication proved recidivism.145  As im-
plicitly stated by the court in Lucky and recognized by Fowler, 
“[i]t is not the adjudication, but the conduct itself, which is rel-
evant.”146 
2. Reliability 
In reaching its holding, the Fifth District Court of Appeal 
in Fowler focused on the language in McKeiver v. Pennsylva-
nia147 and Duncan v. Louisiana,148 which specifically recog-
nized by dictum that a fair and equitable criminal process is 
not founded in the jury and that imposing a jury trial within 
the juvenile system would not greatly strengthen the fact find-
ing function.149  The court reasoned that since juveniles can 
constitutionally be adjudicated, “there is no constitutional im-
pediment” in the use of juvenile adjudications to enhance a 
sentence at later adult proceedings.150 
The Sixth District Court of Appeal disagreed with the ra-
tionale in Fowler.151  First, this court criticized the Fowler 
court’s need to disparage the importance and accuracy of the 
jury.152  Second, unlike the McKeiver court’s conclusion that a 
 
 141.  People v. Lucky, 45 Cal. 3d 259 (1988). 
 142.  Nguyen, 146 Cal. App. 4th at 1352 (citing Lucky, 45 Cal. 3d at 296). 
 143.  Id. at 1353 (quoting People v. Fowler, 72 Cal. App. 4th 581, 586 (1999)). 
 144.  Id.; See generally U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 145.  Nguyen, 146 Cal. App. 4th at 1353. 
 146.  Id. at 1353 (quoting Lucky, 45 Cal. 3d at 295). 
 147.  McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 547 (1971). 
 148.  Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149-50 (1968). 
 149.  Nguyen, 146 Cal. App. 4th at 1353 (citing People v. Fowler, 72 Cal. App. 
4th 581, 586 (1999)); see generally Duncan, 391 U.S. at 149-50; McKeiver, 403 
U.S. at 547. 
 150.  Nguyen, 146 Cal. App. 4th at 1353 (quoting Fowler, 72 Cal. App. 4th at 
586). 
 151.  Nguyen, 146 Cal. App. 4th at 1354-55. 
 152.  Id. at 1354. 
938 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol:55 
jury trial is not a necessity in producing accurate fact finding, 
subsequent legal developments found that the fact finding ac-
curacy of the jury is unacceptably impaired when it consists of 
less than six people.153  In the court’s view, it is not that judicial 
fact finding is unreliable in affording due process to juveniles, 
but that in the absence of a jury waiver due process is only 
afforded in non-petty criminal cases when decided by a jury of 
six or more people.154  As stated by the Louisiana Supreme 
Court in State v. Brown:155 
[t]o equate this adjudication with a conviction as a predi-
cate offense for purposes of the Habitual Offender Law 
would subvert the civil trappings of the juvenile adjudica-
tion to an extent to make it fundamentally unfair and thus, 
violate due process. . . . . to continue holding a trial by jury 
is not Constitutionally required, we cannot allow these ad-
judications . . . to be treated as predicate offense the same 
as felony convictions. . . . It seems contradictory and funda-
mentally unfair to provide youths with fewer procedural 
safeguards in the name of rehabilitation and then to use 
these adjudications obtained for treatment purposes to 
punish them more severely as adults.156 
Using a sentencing enhancement during a criminal case 
on an adult offender triggers the Sixth Amendment right to a 
jury trial.157  When California’s Three Strikes law uses a juve-
nile adjudication to enhance an adult offender’s sentence, it 
does so in an adult criminal proceeding where the procedural 
rules of adult criminal cases govern.158 “One of those rules is 
that a criminal sentence must reflect the judgment of a jury of 
at least six members, even if it is a prior conviction, unless that 
jury is waived.”159  By allowing the inclusion of a juvenile adju-
dication as evidence of a prior conviction, the law is not relying 
on the judgment of a six-panel jury, but on the fact finding 
judgment that is constitutionally unacceptable in a criminal 
 
 153.  Id. at 1355 (citing Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 232-33 (1978)) (“When 
individual and group decision-making were compared, it was seen that groups 
performed better because prejudices of individuals were frequently counterbal-
anced, and objectively resulted.”).  
 154.  Id. at 1356. 
 155.  State v. Brown, 879 So. 2d 1276, 1289 (La. 2004). 
 156.  Nguyen, 146 Cal. App. 4th at 1357 (quoting Brown, 879 So. 2d at 1289). 
 157.  Id. 
 158.  Id. 
 159.  Id.  
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case where there is no jury waiver.160 
3. Indispensability 
The right to a jury trial is a fundamental scheme to Amer-
ican justice.161  A jury trial allows for fact finding accuracy and 
prevents government oppression in providing safeguards from 
legal corruption and essentially checking judicial power.162  In 
both Jones and Apprendi, the Sixth District Court of Appeal 
recognized the “vast difference between accepting the validity 
of a prior judgment of conviction entered in a proceeding in 
which the defendant had the right to a jury trial . . . and allow-
ing the judge to find the required fact under a lesser standard 
of proof.”163 
The court recognized this difference and was thus per-
suaded to see that a judgment, even reflecting recidivism, must 
require the procedural safeguard of a jury trial.164  The Sixth 
District Court of Appeal undoubtedly agreed that juveniles re-
ceived the proper safeguards to assure reliability in juvenile 
adjudications, but determined that use of those adjudications 
as a sentencing enhancement in criminal proceedings was con-
stitutionally impermissible for Apprendi purposes.165  Addi-
tionally, this court disagreed with the argument that Penal 
Code section 1025166 solved the constitutional problem.167  An 
overwhelming difference exists between proving to a jury—on 
the one hand—the contested facts of actual criminal conduct 
underlying the adjudication and—on the other hand—that the 
defendant once suffered a juvenile adjudication.168 Therefore, 
this court found that the only way to constitutionally solve this 
problem was in holding that juvenile adjudications do not come 
within the meaning of prior convictions, under Apprendi, due 
to the lack of a jury trial within juvenile proceedings.169 
 
 160.  Id. 
 161.  Id. at 1357 (citing Ballew v. Georgia 435 U.S. 223, 229 (1978)). 
 162.  Nguyen, 146 Cal. App. 4th at 1357-58. 
 163.  Id. at 1359 (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 496). 
 164.  Id.  
 165.  Id. 
 166.  The relevant part of the statute provides a statutory right to the defend-
ant to try the question of whether he actually had suffered the prior conviction in 
front of a jury. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1025 (Deering, 2013).  
 167.  Nguyen, 146 Cal. App. 4th at 1360. 
 168.  Id.  
 169.  Id. 
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“The caveat is that a juvenile adjudication can be used, 
without offending the Constitution, if it is based on the defend-
ant’s admission.”170  A judicial admission creates as much reli-
ability as a jury trial to support a finding of recidivism and the 
use for sentence enhancement.171  Here, the Sixth District 
Court of Appeal held that since the defendant, Nguyen, admit-
ted to the commission that resulted in his juvenile adjudica-
tion, the use of his juvenile adjudication was not prohibited for 
sentence enhancement use; thus, the trial court appropriately 
applied Nguyen’s adjudication under California’s Three 
Strikes law.172 
F. People v. Nguyen: The Court of Appeal of California, 
Sixth Appellate District on Reconsideration 
In the Sixth District Court of Appeal’s original opinion the 
court concluded that an admitted juvenile adjudication was a 
reliable finding that the underlying crime had been commit-
ted.173  In drawing from aspects of Apprendi174 and Blakely,175 
the court originally found that a judicial admission supported 
a “finding of recidivism, [and] that admission is sufficiently re-
liable to support an enhanced sentence based on the court’s 
finding of the admitted fact.”176  However, on reconsideration 
this court found that by focusing on the reliability of an admis-
sion evidenced in Apprendi and Blakely, the court originally 
lost perspective on the additional attributes that did not relate 
to recidivism but were still protected by the Sixth Amendment 
right to a jury trial.177 
Both the defendant in Blakely178 and the defendant in Al-
mendarez-Torres179 had the right to a jury trial at some point 
 
 170.  Id. at 1360. 
 171.  Id. at 1360-61. 
 172.  Id. at 1361. 
 173.  Id. at 1237. 
 174.  Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). 
 175.  Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). 
 176.  Nguyen, 152 Cal. App. 4th at 1237-38. 
 177.  Id. 
 178.  Blakely, 542 U.S. at 298; Nguyen, 152 Cal. App. 4th at 1238 (“Blakely’s 
negotiated plea to second degree kidnapping involving domestic violence and fire-
arm use was made with the full knowledge that he could have insisted on a jury 
trial on the underlying facts.”). 
 179.  Nguyen, 152 Cal. App. 4th at 1238 (“Alemandarez-Torres made his ad-
mission that he had previously been convicted of aggravated felonies, he had al-
ready been afforded the chance to challenge the facts underlying those convictions 
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in their proceedings, which fulfilled the constitutional role of 
the jury trial regardless of whether they took advantage of that 
right.180  As stated by the court in Blakely, even when the de-
fendant gives up the right to a jury trial that right still plays 
its constitutional role “because the very reason the Framers 
put a jury-trial guarantee in the Constitution is that they were 
unwilling to trust the government to mark out the role of the 
jury.”181  Thus, the defendant—not the government—makes 
the decision as to whether the “costs [of a jury trial] outweigh 
its benefits.”182 
Here, the Sixth District Court of Appeal reasoned that 
Nguyen’s juvenile status prevented him from reaping the ben-
efits of a jury determination for the underlying adjudication.183  
The jury’s role in verifying his adjudication for his sentence en-
hancement resulted in only “making a determination that the 
defendant at some point did something wrong, a mere prelim-
inary to a judicial inquisition into the facts of the crime the 
State actually seeks to punish.”184  Therefore, the sentencing 
enhancement did not fully reflect a knowledgeable and intelli-
gent waiver of the jury or a jury determination.185 
In its first finding, the court did not sufficiently take into 
account Blakely, which focused on the possible damage that a 
lack of a jury trial can cause and the intent behind the division 
of judge and jury.186  Thus, after reconsideration, the Sixth Dis-
trict Court of Appeal held that enhancing a sentence beyond 
the statutory maximum by use of a prior juvenile adjudication 
under California’s Three Strikes law violated the rights given 
under Apprendi,187 regardless of whether the adjudication re-
sulted from a contested hearing or an admission.188 
 
at a jury trial.”).  
 180.  Nguyen, 152 Cal. App. 4th at 1238. 
 181.  Id. (quoting Blakely, 542 U.S. at 308 (italics added)). 
 182.  Id. (quoting Blakely, 542 U.S. at 310). 
 183.  Id.  
 184.  Id. (quoting Blakely 542 U.S. at 307 (footnote omitted)). 
 185.  Id. 
 186.  Nguyen, 152 Cal. App. 4th at 1239; Blakely, 542 U.S. at 313 (reasoning 
that it turned on whether the efficiency or fairness of criminal justice was im-
paired by the jury trial right. An argument that fairness and efficiency would 
better be left in the hands of professionals could be made, but the Framers of the 
Constitution instead limited the state power by the division of judge and jury). 
 187.  Nguyen, 152 Cal. App. 4th at 1239. 
 188.  This court notes that its holding in no way entitled juveniles the right to 
a jury trial, it does not affect juveniles whose cases are transferred to adult courts, 
942 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol:55 
G. California Binding Decision: People v. Nguyen, The 
Supreme Court of California189 
The California Supreme Court granted review of People v. 
Nguyen and in turn reversed the California Court of Appeal,190 
holding that under Apprendi, the absence of the right to a jury 
trial under juvenile law did not preclude the use of the adjudi-
cation to enhance the maximum statutory sentence for an en-
suing adult felony offense by the same defendant.191 
In rejecting the Court of Appeal’s claims, the California 
Supreme Court reasoned that the rule in Apprendi only ap-
plied to “any ‘fact’ that allows enhancement of an adult defend-
ant’s maximum sentence for the current offense [and that fact] 
must, unless the defendant waives his jury-trial right, be de-
termined by a jury in the current case.”192  The statutorily rel-
evant fact at issue in this case was whether Nguyen’s record 
included a qualifying adjudication under California’s Three 
Strikes law allowing for the enhancement of his current sen-
tence.193  As long as Nguyen had the right for a jury to decide 
the “fact” which allowed for an enhanced sentence in his adult 
case, he fell under Apprendi; California statutory law gave him 
such right.194  In California, for purposes of enhancing the sen-
tence for current charges, the defendant may dispute an alle-
gation that he suffered a prior conviction by submitting to a 
jury the question of whether he “had suffered” the prior convic-
tion.195  In the current proceeding Nguyen expressly waived his 
 
and it has no application outside those 16 or 17 years of age who were accused of 
less serious crimes, remained in juvenile court and received an adjudication, 
whether by trial or admission, whose adjudication is then used to justify sen-
tences in excess of the statutory maximum that could be imposed in adult court 
for the underlying crime. See Nguyen, 152 Cal. App. 4th at 1239.  
 189.  People v. Nguyen, 209 P.3d 946 (2009). 
 190.  Id. at 959. 
 191.  Id. at 959. 
 192.  Id. at 950-51. 
 193.  Id.  
 194.  Id. at 950-51, n.8. The issue of whether the defendant suffered a prior 
conviction must be tried to the court without a jury. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 
1025(c) (Deering, 2013). The trier of fact determines whether a prior conviction 
qualifies under the Three Strikes law. People v. Kelii, 21 Cal. 4th 452, 455-59 
(1999). The judge must determine whether prior convictions were from charges 
brought and tried separately. See People v. Willey, 9 Cal. 4th 580, 583,92 (1995).  
 195.  Nguyen, 209 P.3d at 951; CAL. PENAL CODE § 1025(a) (Deering, 2013); 
CAL. PENAL CODE § 1025(b) (Deering, 2013); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1158 (Deering, 
2013). 
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right to a jury trial on the question of whether he “had suf-
fered” the prior conviction and submitted the issue to the 
court.196 
The Sixth District Court of Appeal did not persuade the 
California Supreme Court by the contention that Apprendi 
contemplated juvenile adjudications as being barred from use 
by implication, citing the language used justifying the only ex-
ception for the fact of a prior conviction.197  The California Su-
preme Court, however, did not read Apprendi as broadly as the 
Sixth District Court of Appeal has above.198  The procedural 
rights and protections in place display that the Constitution 
and the United States Supreme Court saw fit to protect the 
minor while still retaining the informal, rehabilitating, and 
parens patriae purpose of the juvenile justice system.199 
“Prior juvenile adjudications substantially satisfy all of 
the reasons set forth in Almendarez-Torres, Jones, and Ap-
prendi” as to why prior convictions may be used to enhance the 
maximum sentence in an ensuing adult case without the need 
for a jury finding for the prior conviction.200  The California Su-
preme Court reasoned that sentencing concerns the defend-
ant’s recidivism, i.e. their status as a repeat offender.201  That 
recidivism, the previous conviction, was established by crimi-
nal misconduct, and was found with all of the procedural safe-
guards constitutionally required for that proceeding.202  The 
use of an adjudication made with such protections in place did 
not offend the constitutional rights of the adult defendant in 
the subsequent adult proceeding.203 Thus, this court found it 
senseless to conclude that under Apprendi, a juvenile adjudi-
cation deemed reliable when rendered, would be deemed con-
 
 196.  Nguyen, 209 P.3d at 950-51. 
 197.  Id. at 951 (citing Apprendi at 490). “The ‘prior conviction’ exception arises 
from a pre-Apprendi case, Almendarez-Torres, [523 U.S. 224].” Id. . 
 198.  Nguyen, 209 P.3d, at 953.  
 199.  Id. at 953-54 (stating as noted by Justice White in McKeiver v. Pennsyl-
vania, 403 U.S. 528 at 552 (1971) (concurring White, J.) (“[S]uch differences [be-
tween the adult and juvenile system] ameliorate the need, in the juvenile system, 
for the jury’s role as a community buffer against government oppression, judicial 
bias, and politicized justice.”).  
 200.  Nguyen, 209 P.3d at 954-55; see generally Almendarez-Torres 523 U.S. 
224; see generally Jones 526 U.S. 227; see generally Apprendi 530 U.S. at 466  
 201.  Id. at 955. 
 202.  Id. at 955. 
 203.  Id. at 955. 
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stitutionally inadequate later for the establishment of recidi-
vism.204 
Moreover, the United States Supreme Court in Jones, Ap-
prendi, or Almendarez-Torres never stated or implied that a 
prior adjudication that serves as a sentencing factor on the ba-
sis of recidivism needed to come from a proceeding that in-
cluded, particularly, the right to a jury trial.205  The Court in 
Jones and Apprendi never directly addressed the circum-
stances under which a prior adjudication may be used to en-
hance a subsequent adult sentence, making their comments 
purely dictum.206 The Court’s decision that a juvenile adjudica-
tion was sufficiently reliable and constitutionally fair without 
the right to a jury trial has not been disturbed.207  These adju-
dications remain constitutionally founded and, as suggested in 
the decisions above, may be reliably used to enhance succeed-
ing sentences without further jury involvement.208  A juvenile 
adjudication is “highly probative on the issue of recidivism;” 
thus, here, the United States Supreme Court declined to hold 
that a juvenile adjudication, for the sole reason of a lack of a 
jury trial, could not be made available to enhance sentencing 
in an adult proceeding.209 
Lastly, the California Supreme Court disagreed with the 
argument that a juvenile adjudication represented itself as fair 
and equitable for the juvenile purposes, but not for use in a 
subsequent adult proceeding without the right to a jury trial.210  
A prior juvenile adjudication, like an adult conviction, ration-
alizes an increased punishment on the basis of recidivism.211  
Sentencing enhancements based on recidivism are justified un-
der the premise that the current criminal conduct presented 
with past criminal conduct is evidence that the defendant lacks 
reform.212 
The California Supreme Court found support for its deci-
sion in Nichols v. United States,213 which stated that “[t]he 
 
 204.  Nguyen, 209 P.3d at 954-55. 
 205.  Nguyen, 209 P.3d at 956.  
 206.  Id. at 956. 
 207.  Id. at 956-57. 
 208.  Id.  
 209.  Id. 
 210.  Nguyen, 209 P.3d at 957. 
 211.  Id. 
 212.  Id. 
 213.  Nguyen, 209 P.3d at 958 (citing Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 
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rule’s animating principle is the preservation of the jury’s his-
toric role as a bulwark between the State and the accused at 
the trial for an alleged offense.”214  The court found it appropri-
ate to look at the “twin considerations [of] historical practice 
and state sovereignty in deciding if juvenile adjudications ex-
tended to areas not addressed by the high Court.”215 
Past decisions216 established that no historical practice ex-
isted within the traditional domain of juries that pointed to ju-
venile adjudications or adjudicated recidivism as a sentencing 
factor.217  California has, however, expressed within its Three 
Strikes law specific serious prior juvenile adjudications, which 
should serve as “prior felony convictions” for the purpose of 
sentencing enhancements.218  Therefore, the weight within the 
twin considerations is given to the State.219  Accordingly, the 
California Supreme Court found the Sixth District Court of Ap-
peal unpersuasive and held that, for purposes of Apprendi, use 
of a juvenile adjudication under California Three Strikes law 
is valid.220 
H. California Supreme Court Justice Kennard Dissent 
Justice Kennard, characterized the central issue differ-
ently,221 stating that the central issue was the decision by the 
United States Supreme Court in Apprendi v. New Jersey222 and 
whether use of a juvenile adjudication to increase a sentence 
violates the constitutional right to a jury trial.223 
According to Justice Kennard, the development of Ap-
prendi came from the Court’s concern of  “a new trend in the 
 
747-48 (1994)) (noting that recidivism is a basis for sentencing enhancements and 
goes only to the factor of punishment not to the factors of the current offense “and 
that the criminal conduct evidenced by the prior conviction was subject to the 
standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”). 
 214.  Nguyen, 209 P.3d at 959 (citing Oregon v. Ice, 555 U.S. 160, 167-68 
(2009)). 
 215.  Nguyen, 209 P.3d at 959 (quoting Ice, 555 U.S. at 168). 
 216.  See generally Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. 224; Jones v. United States, 
526 U.S. 227 (1999); Apprendi, 530 U.S. 466. 
 217.  Nguyen, 209 P.3d at 959. 
 218.  Id.  
 219.  Id. 
 220.  Id. 
 221.  Nguyen, 209 P.3d at 959-963 (Kennard J. dissenting) 
 222.  Nguyen, 209 P.3d at 960 (Kennard J., dissenting); Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 
466 (noting that the Court that requires a jury trial on any fact increasing the 
statutory maximum for a charged offense). 
 223.  Nguyen, 209 P.3d at 960 (Kennard, J. dissenting). 
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legislative regulation of sentencing.”224 These laws effectively 
diminished the power of juries while increasing that of the trial 
courts.225 As stated by the Court in Booker: 
As enhancements became greater, the jury’s finding of the 
underlying crime became less significant. And the enhance-
ments became very serious indeed . . . [¶] . . . The new sen-
tencing practice forced the Court to address the question 
how the right of jury trial could be preserved, in a meaning-
ful way guaranteeing that the jury would still stand be-
tween the individual and the power of the government un-
der the new sentencing regime.226 
California’s Three Strikes law exemplifies this harsher 
sentencing regime; it requires a sentence be doubled when one 
qualifying underlying felony exists, like a prior adjudication 
here, and a minimum sentence of twenty-five years to life when 
two qualifying prior juvenile adjudications exist.227 As pointed 
out before in the California Supreme Court opinion, juveniles 
do not have the right to a jury trial; thus, in basing an in-
creased punishment on facts not determined by a jury, Califor-
nia’s Three Strikes law, in Kennard’s view, clashes with the 
holding in Apprendi.228 
The reasoning behind the California Supreme Court ma-
jority’s decision failed to persuade Justice Kennard.229  First, 
according to the majority, the holding in Apprendi applied only 
to the adjudication itself and not to the felonious conduct.230 
However, Apprendi stated, “other than the fact of a prior con-
viction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond 
the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, 
and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”231  The italicized lan-
guage, as construed by Justice Kennard, requires a jury deter-
mination on both the existence of the prior adjudication and 
 
 224.  Id. at 960 (Kennard, J. dissenting) (quoting Booker, 543 U.S. at 236). 
 225.  Nguyen, 209 P.3d at 961 (Kennard, J. dissenting). 
 226.  Id. (Kennard, J. dissenting) (quoting Booker, 543 U.S. at 236-37). 
 227.  Id. (Kennard, J. dissenting) (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(d)(3)). 
 228.  Id. (Kennard, J. dissenting) (citing Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490) (“[U]nder 
the Sixth Amendment of the federal Constitution a criminal defendant has a right 
to have a jury determine ‘any fact’ that increases the penalty for a charged of-
fense.”).  
 229.  Nguyen, 209 P.3d at 961 (Kennard, J. dissenting). 
 230.  Id. at 961 (Kennard, J. dissenting). 
 231.  Nguyen, 209 P.3d at 961 (Kennard, J. dissenting) (quoting Apprendi, 530 
U.S. at 490). 
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the conduct that led to the adjudication.232  The essential ele-
ment of Apprendi is that determinations not made by a jury 
cannot be used to increase the sentence beyond the statutory 
maximum.233  Juvenile adjudications are entirely contrary:  a 
juvenile adjudication is simply a legal document stating a 
judge, not a jury, determined the minor committed criminal 
conduct.234 The majority’s reasoning for not finding juvenile ad-
judications contrary to Apprendi revolved around the legisla-
tive control to enact or amend sentence-increasing laws where 
a judge determines if the aggravated circumstance occurred 
and the jury, after the fact, decides if the judge actually made 
that specific determination.235  Justice Kennard argued that 
this view did not accurately reflect the United States Supreme 
Court’s intent in Apprendi.236 
Additionally, the California Supreme Court majority’s 
finding is inconsistent with its 2008 decision in People v. 
Towne.237 In Towne, the court held that, under Apprendi,  a 
prior determination of a parole or probation violation in a non-
jury revocation proceeding could not be used to increase a de-
fendant’s sentence.238  The California Supreme Court implied 
in Towne that the right to a jury trial not only extends to the 
adjudication itself but also to the conduct of the underlying ad-
judication.239  As a result, the majority’s interpretation of Ap-
prendi cannot be reconciled with its later decision in Towne.240 
The second main point Justice Kennard made was that the 
United States Supreme Court had yet to decide whether the 
“fact of a prior conviction” exception in Apprendi applies to ju-
venile adjudications.241  The Apprendi Court stated, “that the 
exception to the jury trial right applies only to the ‘fact of a 
prior conviction.’ ” 242  It is common language and knowledge in 
 
 232.  Id. (Kennard, J. dissenting). 
 233.  Nguyen, 209 P.3d at 962 (Kennard, J. dissenting ) (citing Apprendi, 530 
U.S. at 466). 
 234.  Id. (Kennard, J. dissenting). 
 235.  Id.  
 236.  Id.  
 237.  Nguyen, 209 P.3d at 962 (Kennard, J. dissenting). 
 238.  Nguyen, 209 P.3d at 962 (Kennard, J. dissenting) (citing Towne, 44 Cal. 
4th 63, 82-83). 
 239.  Id. (Kennard, J. dissenting). 
 240.  Id.  
 241.  Id. at 963 (Kennard, J. dissenting). 
 242.  Nguyen, 209 P.3d at 963 (Kennard, J. dissenting) (quoting Apprendi, 530 
U.S. at 490). 
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the field of law that convictions do not arise out of juvenile ad-
judications, but rather are obtained through adult proceedings 
where a jury trial right is afforded.243  Thus, Justice Kennard 
found it reasonable to infer that the Apprendi Court did not 
intend this exception to be applied when no jury trial right ex-
isted.244 Rather, when the United States Supreme Court cre-
ated this “exception to the general right to a trial by jury on 
any fact supporting a sentence increase beyond the statutory 
maximum, it did so only for proceedings in which the accused 
did have that right.”245 
Here, the presented problem is not the reliability of juve-
nile adjudications, but the fact that one person—the judge—
determined the juvenile adjudication, which conflicts with the 
constitutional guarantee of a jury trial.246  Therefore, Justice 
Kennard concluded “that the Sixth Amendment’s right to a 
jury trial does not permit a trial court to impose additional 
punishment that is based on prior juvenile criminal conduct for 
which there was no right to a jury trial.”247 
IV. LEGAL AND SOCIAL JUSTICE IMPLICATIONS 
The United States Supreme Court has yet to explicitly ad-
dress the issue of whether a lack of jury trial in juvenile adju-
dications prevents their use as a prior conviction under habit-
ual offender laws and particularly California’s Three Strikes 
law. Thus, the states must individually interpret the most rel-
evant holding, Apprendi v. New Jersey.248 As a result, the issue 
remains as to whether juvenile adjudications under Apprendi 
count as prior convictions for use under a recidivism law.  For 
purposes of California law, they do. The California Supreme 
Court held in a binding decision that, under Apprendi, the ab-
sence of the right to a jury trial under juvenile law does not 
preclude the use of the adjudication to enhance the maximum 
statutory sentence for an ensuing adult felony offense by the 
same defendant under California’s Three Strikes law.249 
 
 243.  Id. (Kennard, J. dissenting). 
 244.  Nguyen, 209 P.3d at 963 (Kennard, J. dissenting). 
 245.  Id.  
 246.  Id.  
 247.  Id.  
 248.  Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. at 554 (2000). 
 249.  Nguyen, 209 P.3d at 959. 
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A. Did the California Supreme Court Get It Right? 
The California Supreme Court’s most compelling argu-
ment came from the section on recidivism; that a juvenile’s 
prior conviction demonstrates a lack of reform.250 Sentencing 
enhancements based on recidivism are justified under the 
premise that the current criminal conduct reflects an increased 
seriousness due to the previous finding of criminal conduct 
showcasing a lack of reform.251  The defendant is back under 
the jurisdiction of the courts and has, if convicted, re-offended. 
However, the California Supreme Court neglected to see the 
difference in culpability that exists when the defendant is an 
adult and when his or her prior conviction comes from a juve-
nile adjudication. 
The Sixth District Court of Appeal correctly and persua-
sively quoted the Louisiana Supreme Court252 in addressing 
the culpability issue and the hypocritical stance that the juve-
nile justice system demonstrated by allowing adjudications to 
count as convictions.253  The court in State v. Brown254 stated 
that equating the adjudication of a juvenile with the conviction 
of an adult is fundamentally unfair and contradictory to the 
establishment and purpose of the juvenile justice system.255  
What is the point of having two systems of judgment when the 
courts are going to equate the judgments of both as carrying 
the same weight? 
Justice Kennard addressed this issue in her dissent of the 
California Supreme Courts decision in Nguyen when she ana-
lyzed Apprendi.256  She stated that it was common language 
and knowledge in the field of law that convictions do not arise 
out of juvenile adjudications, but rather are obtained through 
adult court proceedings where a jury trial right is afforded.257  
The Court in Apprendi stated, “that the exception to the jury 
trial right applies only to the ‘fact of a prior conviction.’ ” 258  
Thus, Justice Kennard found it reasonable to infer that the 
 
 250.  Id. at 957. 
 251.  Id. 
 252.  State v. Brown, 879 So. 2d 1276, 1289 (La. 2004). 
 253.  Nguyen, 146 Cal. App. 4th at 1357 (quoting Brown, 879 So. 2d at 1289). 
 254.  Brown, 879 So. 2d at 1289. 
 255.  Nguyen, 146 Cal. App. 4th at 1357 (quoting Brown, 879 So. 2d at 1289). 
 256.  Nguyen, 209 P.3d at 963 (Kennard, J. dissenting). 
 257.  Id. 
 258.  Id. (Kennard, J. dissenting) (quoting Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490). 
950 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol:55 
Court in Apprendi did not intend this exception to be applied 
when there was no right to a jury trial.259  The United States 
Supreme Court explicitly stated the rule in Apprendi knowing 
that adjudications are not considered equivalent to convictions.  
For the California Supreme Court to then equate the two to-
gether is an impermissible use of the Court’s intentions. 
The Sixth District Court of Appeal stated that recidivism 
was not outside the scrutiny of the Constitution.260  Purely la-
beling a defendant a recidivist does not mean that that defend-
ant should not be afforded the same procedural safeguards.  
When the prior conviction is a juvenile adjudication the proce-
dural safeguards in place are different.  The adult defendant is 
no longer receiving those same procedural safeguards for both 
the current conviction and the adjudication.  As the Sixth Dis-
trict Court of Appeal stated in Nguyen, when California’s 
Three Strikes law uses a juvenile adjudication to enhance an 
adult offender’s sentence it is doing so in an adult criminal pro-
ceeding and is bound by the rules governing adult criminal 
cases.261  A judge makes the determination in a juvenile adju-
dication, the jury makes the determination in an adult convic-
tion; a jury consists of at least six people, a judge is one per-
son.262  The presented problem is not the reliability of juvenile 
adjudications, but the fact that one individual, the judge, de-
termined the juvenile adjudication, which contradicts the con-
stitutional guarantee of a jury trial in adult court.263 
The California Supreme Court in Nguyen argued that the 
language of Apprendi only applied a jury determination on any 
fact that allows an enhancement beyond the statutory maxi-
mum in the current offense.264  Simply put, as long as the de-
fendant in the adult proceeding has the opportunity to have his 
or her past conviction verified (i.e., submitted) to a jury, then 
Apprendi is satisfied.265 However, that interpretation is not 
founded if Apprendi only applies to recidivist laws.  Recidivism, 
as the Sixth District Court of Appeal stated, comes from the 
conduct leading to the adjudication and not the adjudication 
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itself.266 
Justice Kennard’s dissent in the California Supreme Court 
decision in Nguyen addressed this issue best by understanding 
that the holding in Apprendi applied to recidivism, and thus a 
jury must determine both the fact of the conviction and the 
conduct that led to such conviction.267  Justice Kennard quoted 
Apprendi, which stated, “other than the fact of a prior convic-
tion, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the 
prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and 
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”268  The italicized language, 
as construed by Justice Kennard, requires a jury finding on 
both the existence of the prior adjudication and the conduct 
that led to the adjudication.269  The adjudication is viewed as 
“any fact,” meaning the conduct proving recidivism and the ad-
judication need to be submitted to a jury trial.270  Thus, the 
intent of the United States Supreme Court in Apprendi, based 
on the language, according to Justice Kennard, is to apply the 
right to a jury trial to both the conduct and the adjudication.271 
The California Supreme Court did not give this argument 
the consideration it deserved.  The court simply based its deci-
sion on the United States Supreme Court finding in McKeiver 
v. Pennsylvania,272 and held that juveniles were given all of the 
procedural safeguards necessary to protect the minor while 
maintaining the informal nature of the juvenile justice sys-
tem.273  The court felt it senseless to conclude that under Ap-
prendi, a juvenile adjudication that is deemed reliable under 
the Constitution when rendered, would be deemed constitu-
tionally inadequate to establish recidivism for sentence en-
hancement.274  Yet McKeiver was decided in 1971,275 when ad-
judications were simply just that: adjudications. The United 
States Supreme Court never considered that adjudications 
would eventually be used as convictions.  The amount of time 
 
 266.  Nguyen, 146 Cal. App. 4th at 1353; See Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 484. 
 267.  Nguyen, 209 P.3d at 951 (Kennard, J. dissenting). 
 268.  Nguyen, 209 P.3d at 963 (Kennard, J. dissenting) (quoting Apprendi, 530 
U.S. at 490). 
 269.  Id. (Kennard, J. dissenting). 
 270.  Id. at 962 (Kennard J. dissenting). 
 271.  Id. at 962 (Kennard J. dissenting). 
 272.  McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 550-51 
 273.  Nguyen, 209 P.3d at 953-55. 
 274.  Nguyen, 209 P.3d at 955. 
 275.  McKeiver, 403 U.S. 528. 
952 SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW [Vol:55 
that has passed and the changes to society, to the judicial sys-
tem, and to people are insurmountable.  The United States Su-
preme Court has not reconsidered the potential for judicial bias 
since 1971. It is radically wrong to continue to so strongly rely 
on this holding without considering that the face of the juvenile 
system has changed. 
The Sixth District Court of Appeal cited to subsequent le-
gal holdings, which found the fact finding accuracy of the jury 
unacceptably impaired when it consisted of less than six peo-
ple.276  Jurors counterbalance one another’s internal biases 
when coming to a conclusion.277 Stated differently, no balance 
exists when one individual makes the decision. However, this 
potential danger does not diminish the reliability of a juvenile 
adjudication within the system since the punishment is less 
severe and the record of the adjudication can be sealed.  It is 
when those two concepts are ousted that the danger becomes 
life changing.  In terms of California’s Three Strikes law, a 
qualifying prior conviction doubles a defendant’s sentence for 
the current offense.278  With two qualifying prior convictions 
the defendant’s sentence increases to twenty-five years to 
life.279  The stakes for the defendant drastically change when 
he or she moves from the juvenile system to the adult system, 
and to allow the adjudication to be deemed as reliable as a jury 
determination is fundamentally unfair. 
The California Supreme Court in Nguyen pointed to the 
use of California Penal Code section 1025(C) as overcoming the 
jury trial problem with juvenile adjudications.280 In California, 
for purposes of enhancing the sentence for a current offense, 
the defendant may dispute an allegation that he suffered a 
prior conviction by submitting the question of whether he “had 
suffered” the prior conviction, unless a jury is waived, to a 
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jury.281  However, California Penal Code section 1025(C) does 
not truly guarantee a jury determination on that issue. As il-
lustrated in the California Supreme Court’s opinion, what the 
jury determined was severely limited.282  The court determines 
the issue of who suffered the prior conviction; the court deter-
mines the issue of whether that prior conviction qualifies un-
der the statute; and lastly the court determines the issue of 
whether the prior convictions were brought and tried sepa-
rately.283  As a result, the judge determines if the record of the 
prior conviction is that of the defendant’s, if a qualifying prior 
conviction exists, and if it was brought under the proper proce-
dures.284  What does the jury decide? The California statute 
that the California Supreme Court relied on in determining 
that Apprendi was met does not even fall under Apprendi. Un-
fortunately, Nguyen never made this argument, instead only 
suggested it in passing.285 
Apart from the above argument, the Sixth District Court 
of Appeal persuasively rejected the notion that California Pe-
nal Code section 1025(C) accurately reflected the necessity of a 
jury trial under Apprendi.286  The court stated that an over-
whelming disparity existed between proving to a jury contested 
facts of actual criminal conduct underlying the adjudication 
and proving to a jury that the defendant once suffered a juve-
nile adjudication.287  Proving that a defendant once suffered an 
adjudication is done merely by showing a record; a juvenile ad-
judication is simply a legal document stating a judge, not a 
jury, determined the minor committed criminal conduct.288  
Any reasonable juror would find reliability in a court document 
stating that the defendant in the case suffered a prior adjudi-
cation.  No question would exist as to the validity of the claim. 
Comparing that decision-making process with that of a juror 
who is posed with the question of whether the necessary con-
duct actually existed is ridiculous.  The jury looks at facts, 
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hears both sides, and comes to an intelligent and informed de-
cision.  Conversely, in determining if the defendant “had suf-
fered”289 the jury only sees one component, the record. The two 
decisions do not equate. 
Ultimately, in answering which court got it right, the most 
persuasive arguments are from the Sixth District Court of Ap-
peal 290and Justice Kennard’s dissent in the California Su-
preme Court opinion.291 The arguments by the Sixth District 
Court of Appeal and Justice Kennard reflect an in-depth un-
derstanding of the purpose of the juvenile justice system and 
the biases present in turning an adjudication into a conviction. 
Not only is it fundamentally unfair to hypocritically apply the 
adjudication as a conviction, but it is legally impermissible.  
The danger of continuing to allow these adjudications to be 
treated as convictions is severe.  Nguyen’s sentence was dou-
bled by his adjudication,292 if he had two adjudications then his 
sixteen-month sentence could have turned into a life sentence. 
Too much is at stake under California’s Three Strikes law to 
allow for a finding of truth in juvenile court to be applied as a 
finding of guilt in the adult court. 
B. Social Justice Implications 
An encounter with the juvenile justice system as an ado-
lescent poses the potential risk for a lifelong relationship with 
the criminal system.  The purpose of the juvenile justice system 
is to limit or break that potential relationship through rehabil-
itating the minor.293 However, when punitive repercussions re-
place rehabilitative measures the juvenile system fails. 
Without the confidential safeguard of the right to a jury 
trial and the criminal justice system’s lack of faith in the mi-
nor, the transformation of the juvenile justice system’s due pro-
cess rights since In re Gault leave juveniles with few options. 
The juvenile court wanted to treat the juvenile procedurally as 
an adult, while retaining its rehabilitative image.  Yet, by 
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guaranteeing the juvenile offender almost all of the same pro-
cedural safeguards afforded to adults, the juvenile system es-
sentially discarded its view of correcting or rehabilitating a 
condition and picked up the adult system’s view of conviction 
and punishment. 
In addition to the constitutional inequality present in the 
use of adjudications as convictions under California’s Three 
Strikes law, juveniles should not be treated as adults because 
just that; juveniles are not adults.  Juveniles are not cogni-
tively developed enough to understand the consequences of 
their actions.294 Traditionally, accepting responsibility for 
what one has done served as a demonstration of a key measure 
in finding guilt or intent in one’s actions. 
The age of an offender does not only reflect the youth of 
the juvenile, but also the development of necessary decision—
making impulses in the brain.295 The frontal lobe, associated 
with impulse control and judgment making, does not fully de-
velop until a person’s mid-twenties,296 yet the law considers ju-
veniles to be adults at eighteen, and are treated as adults un-
der California’s Three Strikes law at the age of sixteen.297  
Traditionally, “kids could be kids”; even if juveniles committed 
a crime during a lapse of judgment the juvenile system was 
there to guide them back to the right path. However, our juve-
nile system no longer allows for the same mistakes to be made; 
juveniles who are just being kids will forever be haunted by 
those mistakes. 
As evidenced in Nguyen, the definition of reform has 
changed.298 At age sixteen Nguyen spent his entire detention 
confined to juvenile hall.299  Proper rehabilitation techniques 
provide juveniles with the skills and knowledge needed to bet-
ter themselves and their community.300  The purposes behind 
the juvenile system are that the state would better serve as a 
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guardian for the juvenile and help them to become a productive 
member of society.301  However, by changing the criminal sys-
tem’s view of the minor through laws such as California’s 
Three Strikes law, the criminal system no longer only focuses 
on making juveniles better members of society, but instead on 
punishing them twice for childish mistakes. 
Habitual offender laws—such as California’s Three 
Strikes law—illuminate the view of our juvenile system and 
adult criminal system as revolving doors. The juvenile past 
cannot be escaped or put behind a person even after they have 
fully complied with the consequences of their actions.  Califor-
nia’s Three Strikes law does not take into consideration the 
youth of the juvenile, it only sees the adjudication as a convic-
tion and the adult as a repeat criminal. The California Three 
Strikes law as applied to juveniles highlights the disparities in 
our juvenile system and worsens the American public’s under-
standing of a fair and equitable legal system. 
V. REMOVING SUBSECTION (D)(3) FROM CALIFORNIA’S THREE 
STRIKES LAW 
California’s Three Strikes law should be revised to exclude 
California Penal Code section 667(d)(3), which allows prior ju-
venile adjudications to count as prior convictions for strike of-
fenses.302  The inclusion section 667(d)(3) highlights the legis-
lature’s mistake of equating juvenile adjudications with adult 
violent or serious felonies and should be stricken from the stat-
ute.  As indicated above, the use of a prior adjudication that 
was determined without the procedural safeguards of the jury 
trial lacks the appropriate reliability ensured in convictions of 
serious or violent felonies under the adult system.  By elimi-
nating this subdivision from the statute, the state of California 
could return to the clear line traditionally drawn between the 
juvenile justice system and the adult court. 
The impact of eliminating the use of juvenile adjudications 
as prior convictions under California’s Three Strikes law would 
be two-fold. First, from a legal perspective, courts would no 
longer question the constitutional safeguards in place for juve-
niles. Second, the question of whether a right to a jury trial 
exists in the juvenile system would be eliminated, and Courts 
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courts could soundly rely on McKeiver v. Pennsylvania. The 
constitutional safeguards in place would be as applicable as the 
United States Supreme Court saw them in 1971.  Juveniles 
would still be held accountable for their actions due to the 
court’s ability to apply sentencing elements within the statu-
tory maximum range.  This elimination would revert our juve-
nile system back to the original purpose. 
If section 667(d)(3)303 was nonexistent at the time of Ngu-
yen’s juvenile adjudication then his adjudication would only 
have been used as a sentencing factor and not an automatic 
enhancement in his subsequent adult proceeding.304  Thus, 
Nguyen’s adjudication and past behavior would be considered 
by the court, but not allow the court to double his base sen-
tence.  This change acknowledges the fact that juveniles are 
not guaranteed the safeguard of a right to a jury trial. It is im-
portant to note that this does not mean that juveniles cannot 
obtain convictions applicable to California’s Three Strikes law. 
A juvenile may still obtain a conviction under the jurisdic-
tion of the adult criminal system as defined by California’s 
Three Strikes law.305 The juvenile court has the discretion to 
remove a juvenile from its jurisdiction and place that juvenile 
in adult court.306  Once the juvenile is tried as an adult, the 
court’s finding, if the finding is guilty, is considered a convic-
tion.307 Thus, the proposal here is not that juveniles who com-
mit certain crimes should not be held accountable under Cali-
fornia’s Three Strikes law, rather that adjudications and 
convictions should not be equated as such. When a juvenile re-
ceives a conviction from adult proceedings they receive the 
right to a jury trial and thus have the procedural safeguards 
needed to create reliability within the conviction.  When a ju-
venile is adjudicated, they do not have the reliability of the jury 
and lack the appropriate due process safeguards needed for an 
automatic sentence enhancement. 
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CONCLUSION 
Vincent Nguyen’s case showcased a modern day applica-
tion of a juvenile adjudication under the Three Strikes law.  
Both the Sixth District Court of Appeal,308 in its first opinion 
and on reconsideration, and the California Supreme Court,309 
relied heavily on a multitude of United States Supreme Court 
decisions.310 This reliance, although relevant in creating a legal 
foundation, clouds the main flaw in the system; a clear legal 
holding does not exist on whether juvenile adjudications con-
stitutionally count as prior convictions under California’s 
Three Strikes law. 
Here, the Sixth District Court of Appeal and the California 
Supreme Court analyzed the most relevant United States Su-
preme Court decision in an attempt to address the above 
flaw.311 Both courts differed in their interpretations. Although 
the Sixth District Court of Appeal’s interpretation of Apprendi 
v. New Jersey312 was overruled,313 its opinion, arguably, is the 
better application. Juvenile adjudications do not traditionally 
fall within a conviction, they do not create the same recidivism, 
and they do not receive the appropriate constitutional safe-
guards to be treated like a conviction. Thus, legally a juvenile 
adjudication’s use under the Three Strikes law is impermissi-
ble. 
Additionally, the social justice implications represent a 
lack of understanding of juveniles.  The juvenile justice system 
was specifically created to help guide the juvenile through re-
habilitative measures. But this system weakens as more puni-
tive measures are sought in place of rehabilitation. California’s 
Three Strikes law, as applied to juveniles, is unjust and is lead-
ing the juvenile justice system further away from the tradi-
tional goals of correcting the youth’s condition and closer to 
mirroring the adult criminal system. 
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